The March 26, 2025, Court of Appeals opinion on the case of Yu v. Jonas, affirmed the family’s court award of permanent periodic alimony to Wife despite the parties’ short marriage.
While the Yu opinion doesn’t provide dates, the parties had a short marriage. The parties met over the internet. Jonas lived in South Carolina; Yu lived in China. Jonas invited Yu to this country, they married, and Yu quickly became pregnant. Jonas’s earnings were the family’s sole means of support throughout the marriage, even after Yu had to return to China with the parties’ child. Yu and the child spent several years waiting in China before she could legally re-enter the United States.
At trial, the family court awarded Yu permanent periodic alimony and Jonas appealed, arguing Yu should have only received rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals did not disagree with Jonas’ factual assertions that Yu graduated from high school and college in China, had a successful career in China, is able-bodied, and is capable of working. However it noted, Yu’s income was roughly $16,000 per year and that she had relied on Jonas’ salary as an IT director for a school district for support during the marriage. It noted Yu was seeking additional training and education to increase her income but the length of time it would take her to accomplish this and what her income would be at the end of the process were both uncertain.
The Court of Appeals noted a “requirement for rehabilitative alimony [is] that the record must show the recipient will be able to match the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage at the end of the expired payments.” It held, “Nobody attempted to satisfy these standards when this case was tried.”
Judge Thomas dissented. Relying largely on Justice Few’s dissent in Rudick v. Rudick, 437 S.C. 270, 280, 878 S.E.2d 686, 691 (2022), she believed this was a case that called for rehabilitative alimony. She noted, “the preference for periodic alimony is not based in the statute, and many of the cases recognizing a preference were decided before the comprehensive amendments to section 20-3-130 in 1990.”
Judge Thomas also noted, “the marriage was short and Yu is young, healthy, and educated. In addition, Yu testified she was transferring her degree to the United States and that once she obtained the transfer, she needed ‘a half year or one year [of] training to get a job.’ Yu demonstrated the desire to improve her English skills, which she indicated would greatly improve her likelihood of success in the job market. I find evidence demonstrating Yu could become self-sufficient within relatively few years and rehabilitative alimony should have been awarded.”
Yu continues a decades-long trend of the appellate courts essentially blocking any award of rehabilitative alimony if the supported spouse objects. Bryan v. Bryan, 296 S.C. 305, 372 S.E.2d 116, 119 (Ct.App. 1988) is the last reported South Carolina appellate opinion affirming rehabilitative alimony—and it’s from 1988. Even the 2024 opinion in Gandy v. Gandy, 442 S.C. 340, 898 S.E.2d 208 (Ct.App. 2024), reversed an award of rehabilitative alimony by awarding Wife no alimony.
I handled the appeal for Ms. Rudick. Rudick was my invitation/suggestions to the Supreme Court to turn a permanent alimony award into a rehabilitative one because Ms. Rudick had been the primary caretaker of the parties’ home and children. Only Justice Few accepted my argument. Prior to the oral argument in Yu, I argued in favor of permanent alimony and against an award of rehabilitative alimony in Ferguson v. Ferguson. No opinion has yet issued in Ferguson. Although the hearing panels had no overlap, Yu would appear to support Ms. Ferguson’s position that she deserves permanent alimony.
However, if I am mistaken about the ultimate result in Ferguson, I will truly savor the irony that I couldn’t prevent a primary-homemaker Ms. Rudick from paying permanent periodic alimony to her husband while I couldn’t get a primary-homemaker Ms. Ferguson permanent periodic alimony from her husband.
